Introduction

Court orders are meant to settle disputes, not reduce the value of justice. Yet court charges in Ghana quietly reduce the value of money paid through the courts. Money paid into court attracts a 5% charge on deposit and another 5% on withdrawal. This rule quietly affects judgment debts, maintenance, damages, and costs. Many litigants only discover the charge after the court has already decided their case. The result is simple but troubling. The person ordered to pay spends more than the court directed. The person entitled to receive money gets less than the court awarded. This article explains how the rule works, how it affects real cases, and why it deserves reform.

What are the 5% Court Charges in Ghana all about?

Court rules require a percentage charge on money paid into and taken out of court. Under the Civil Proceedings (Fees and Allowances) Rules 2007 (C.I.55) (as amended by C.I.86), the court charges 5% on money paid into court. The court charges another 5% when that same money is withdrawn. These charges apply automatically once money passes through the court’s account.
They are calculated as a percentage of the total sum involved. There is no stated maximum cap on the amount chargeable. The charge applies regardless of the reason for the payment. It affects judgment debts, security for costs, maintenance, and other court-ordered payments. The rules do not describe the charge as a tax or a penalty. In practice, it operates as an administrative fee tied to the amount of money involved.

The charge applies whether payment into court is mandatory or ordered for convenience. It also applies even where both parties agree on the amount to be paid.

How the Rule Works in Practice and Affects Litigants

The impact of the rule becomes clear once a case is concluded.  When a court orders a party to pay money into court, the payor must add 5%. If the judgment sum is GH₵100,000, the payor deposits GH₵105,000. When the successful party applies to withdraw the money, another 5% is deducted. The payee receives GH₵95,000. Or the payee must pay GHS 5000 to the court in order to receive the GH₵100,000. These court charges in Ghana change the real value of court judgments.

This outcome affects judgment debts, costs, and damages in civil cases. It also applies to maintenance orders and alimony in family law matters. The charge affects all money paid into court. The paying party complies fully with the court order but still pays more. The receiving party wins the case but still receives less. The rule quietly alters the substance of court judgments without judicial discretion. This issue also affects estate administration and probate processes in Ghana.

Consequences of the 5% Court Charge

The rule creates incentives that undermine safe and transparent payment. Over time, these effects discourage litigants from using court-supervised payment mechanisms. Many litigants avoid paying money into court altogether. They prefer private transfers to escape the 5% charge. This shift removes the protection that court-controlled deposits provide. Disputes then arise over whether payment was made or received and exactly how much. The court loses a clear audit trail for enforcement. In some cases, a losing party exploits the rule out of spite. They insist on payment into court to reduce what the winner receives. In practice, even court staff sometimes suggest private payment to avoid the charge. This response from litigants and even staff is a direct reflection of the burden the rule creates. The rule turns procedure into a tool of pressure rather than justice. It weakens trust in court-supervised financial processes.

Why the 5% Court Charges In Ghana Is Unjustified

The charge is presented as an administrative fee for handling money. Administrative fees should reflect the actual cost of the service provided. A percentage-based fee does the opposite. It increases as the amount involved increases, without extra work by the court. The court does not invest the money or assume commercial risk. Commercial banks lend, invest, and manage financial exposure. They handle billions daily but cap transfer fees to protect customers. The court performs a simpler function yet charges a flat percentage without any maximum limit. This means a ten-million cedi judgment attracts a fee far beyond any real administrative work. Justice should not cost more than the banking services used to deliver it. A 5% charge can exceed realistic administrative costs many times over. The rule turns a court process into a revenue mechanism rather than a public service.

Even more concerning is the basis of the 5% withdrawal charge. A review of C.I. 55 (2007) and its amendments, C.I. 86 (2014) and C.I. 123 (2019), shows that the rules expressly authorise a 5% charge on payments into court. They do not, however, provide for a percentage-based deduction on payments out of court. The only withdrawal-related fees stated in the schedules are small fixed amounts in limited circumstances. The current practice therefore applies the entry fee twice, once at deposit and again at withdrawal, without a clear statutory basis in the governing instruments.

What Happens in Other Countries

A brief comparison shows that Ghana’s approach is unusual. Ghana stands with the outliers in charging a high percentage fee on funds deposited with the court. A review of other jurisdictions reveals a starkly different approach that prioritizes preserving the value of money.

In the United Kingdom, the Court Funds Office (CFO) does not tax deposits. Instead, in many cases, it actually pays interest on funds held in court. The winner receives more than the original sum ordered, not less. The system protects the value of the judgment against inflation.

Nigeria also operates differently. While Nigerian courts charge filing fees, they typically use a “tiered” system with a maximum cap (e.g., a maximum fee of N50,000 regardless of the claim size in some states). They do not automatically deduct 5% from the judgment sum itself just for passing it through the registry.

Similarly, federal courts in the United States charge flat administrative fees for depositing funds, often under $50, rather than a percentage of the asset. By contrast, Ghana’s many provisions in  Ghana’s C.I. 55 operates in a way that resembles a revenue-generating mechanism. This comparison shows that Ghana’s 5% rule is an outlier that penalizes compliance rather than facilitating justice.

Proposed Solution and Conclusion

The problem lies in the structure of the charge, not in court oversight. Courts should continue to receive and safeguard money where necessary. The fee, however, should reflect real administrative costs. One option is a small, fixed fee for handling court deposits. Another option is a modest percentage charge with a clear maximum cap. The court could also remove the charge entirely. Courts already deposit these funds with commercial banks. The banking system absorbs handling costs as part of ordinary operations. Court orders should not lose value during compliance. This critique targets the rule itself, not judges or court staff who apply it as written. Reforming court charges in Ghana would restore fairness to court-ordered payments.